Geography

Geography

Pathology of the relationship between the state and religion in Saudi Arabia with an emphasis on the framework of Jean Guttmann's theory

Document Type : Article extracted From phd dissertation

Authors
1 PhD. Candidate of Political Geography, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Professor of Department of Human Geography, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
As one of the key countries in the Middle East and home to two of the most important cities in the Islamic world, developments in Saudi Arabia inevitably impact the broader Muslim world. However, the nature of political legitimacy, acceptance, and the challenges faced by the government remain uncertain. Moreover, understanding the relationship between the people, religion, and the state in this monarchy is crucial. Approximately 50% of Saudi Arabia's population consists of young people. Managing this segment of society presents a significant political, economic, social, and cultural challenge for the Al Saud regime. If the government fails to control the energy and frustration of these youths, it seems likely that the foundations of the regime could become unstable. This could potentially lead to the rise of social movements in Saudi Arabia. As witnessed during the Arab uprisings of 2011, the possibility of a domino effect in the region exists. Additionally, given the secular behaviors the government is employing to manage this situation, it appears that the relationship between religion and the state in Saudi Arabia is changing. Should this phenomenon continue, the social contract itself may also evolve. Even if social movements emerge in the country, analyzing and predicting their nature from local, national, regional, and even global perspectives is of great importance.
Methodology
The present research adopts a qualitative methodology with a descriptive-analytical and historical approach. Data collection involved documentary-library research and interviews. The study also utilizes books, academic and research articles, both domestic and international, as well as online resources to answer the research questions. The data analysis strategy is inductive.
 
Results and Discussion
The government of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 based on the ideology of Wahhabism and the Al Saud tribe, and these two pillars have remained the foundation of the state until today. The rise to power of Mohammad bin Salman can be seen as the pinnacle of the liberal movement's ascension against the Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood. With the changes introduced by Mohammad bin Salman in recent years, it appears that Wahhabism and the monarchy may no longer continue. The alteration of this alliance poses a significant threat to the future of the Al Saud regime. Therefore, these changes are being implemented cautiously and gradually. Distancing from religion is a major risk that could lead to challenges for the future of Saudi Arabia. The underlying framework of Saudi Arabia's political and social order is based on Sharia, specifically Wahhabism. This is an inseparable part of the country's character and the foundation of the legitimacy of its political and social order. The Saudi government neither created nor inherited religious institutions. In this country, religious elites and politicians have cooperated for many years to establish and protect the state. This explains the overlap between religious and political discourses and also highlights the reason behind the opposition of religious clerics to certain secular actions taken by the government. The Saudi regime derives its legitimacy from Islam.
The king, as the ruler, is responsible for enforcing Islamic laws, and the constitution repeatedly emphasizes the implementation of Islam. Saudi Arabia is known for three things: its unique position in the Middle East, being the world's largest oil exporter, and hosting pilgrims to the Holy Kaaba and the Prophet's Mosque. The religious role remains a high priority for the people. However, with the rise of bin Salman, Wahhabi institutions and movements have become isolated, gradually losing their power, and government policies have leaned towards secularism. Examples of this include the decline of the religious police, changes in the role of women in society, shifts in academic institutions, and the organization of events and festivals where Islamic symbols are absent, such as the Riyadh Season.
 
Conclusion
Iconography, as a spiritual factor and a force gravitating toward the center, is most prominently represented in Saudi Arabia by religion (Wahhabism), which has solidified the state's current structure. However, the government, through its recent actions, has sought to change its relationship with religion, opting for a different narrative of Wahhabism, which it refers to as "moderate Islam." Given the historical background of the Saudi people and the importance of religion and tradition in this country, this shift will likely lead to centrifugal tendencies among the citizens. Initially, it will create dissatisfaction among the people, and secondly, it will integrate citizens into the global context. This will result in a form of dislocation that has not been experienced in Saudi Arabia until now. With the new policies adopted by the Al Saud regime, religion's ability to serve as a unifying force is weakened, turning it into a centrifugal factor. In reality, the iconographic factor has transformed into circulation. Now, with the new religious policies, the government intends to no longer accept Wahhabism as the source of its legitimacy and instead seeks to adopt moderate Islam as its legitimacy factor. Until now, Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the standard-bearer of Islam, as evidenced by the first article of the country's constitution. Therefore, neither bin Salman nor any other ruler in this country can govern outside the framework of Islamic laws or norms. Bin Salman is aware that he cannot change the country's constitution, or if such a change were to occur, it would come at a high cost with an uncertain future. Therefore, he is seeking to construct a new narrative of Islam, called moderate Islam, to govern based on the same Islamic laws created by himself and his allies. It seems that if bin Salman fails in this endeavor, the legitimacy of the state will face challenges, particularly in the eyes of various social groups and especially the religious elite.
Keywords

Subjects


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